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ABSTRACT

The quality of college programs at 13 U.S. military bases and the activities of various agencies for maintaining quality control were evaluated. Based on site visits to military bases in the continental United States and Hawaii in 1978, some academic programs appeared to have few standards and practices that promote quality. It is claimed that base commanders and the education service officers have problems by not securing outside, respected academic advice in selecting the colleges and universities (local or distant) to be allowed on the base, and by ill-defining the scope and mix of their academic programs. Problems were found with regard to maintaining high academic standards in the hiring of instructional staff, curricular deviations from traditional academic norms, intensive weekend programs offered twice a month, credit for basic training and correspondence courses, little or no residency requirements, inadequacies in educational counseling, and inadequate facilities. Existing systems for quality control of college programs at military bases are considered for: the U.S. Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of each of the armed services, various education commands of the armed services, base or ship commanders, education service officers, participating colleges and universities, state licensing and/or higher education coordinating bodies, associations of higher education, federal agencies that award or monitor grants, and regional and professional accrediting bodies. Appended materials include information on off-duty educational programs of the four services, found on 13 military bases, and a bibliography. (SW)

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Academic Quality Control: The Case of College Programs on Military Bases



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Contents

Foreword v
Preface vii
Introduction 1
The Problem 1
Guidelines for Measuring Quality 3
Historical Background 6
The Military and Education 6
The Non-traditional Studies Movement 7
The Present Reality 10
Who Gets on Base? 11
What Is Offered and Taught, and by Whom? 13
The Accumulation of Credit 18
Counseling 23
Facilities 24
Quality Control: Whose Responsibility Is It? 27
The Congress 28
The Department of Defense 29
Base Commanders 30
Education Service Officers 31
Participating Colleges and Universities 31
State Licensing and Higher Education Coordinating Bodies 32
Federal Agencies 33
Higher Education Associations 34
Accrediting Associations 35
What To Do? 38
Footnotes 40
Appendix A: Off-Duty Education Programs of the Four Services 43
U.S. Army 43
U.S. Navy 44
U.S. Air Force 45
U.S. Marine Corps 45
Appendix B: Partial List of Colleges and Universities Whose Programs Were Found on the Thirteen Bases Visited by the Author During 1978 46
Bibliography 48

Foreword

Controlling the quality of academic programs offered by American colleges and universities has always been a difficult and maddeningly elusive task. Unevenness in the instructional worth of particular courses, variations in standards for the grading of student performance, wide latitude in the acceptance of transfer credits—these and similar anomalies have haunted the academy for generations. Even with conscientious attempts on the part of presidents, provosts, deans, faculty committees, and department chairmen to monitor academic quality from the inside, and even with various forms and intensities of external monitoring by governmental agencies and private accrediting bodies, every academic institution has had its weak instructors, gut courses, and shoddy programs. This has been as true of the Ivy-League and the most prestigious land-grant universities as it has been of small, independent liberal arts colleges, or two- or four-year public institutions.

During the past decade, however, various forces seem to have extended the historic reality of academic unevennesses. Although they are often associated exclusively—and sometimes quite unfairly—with extension services and "non-traditional studies," these forces have in fact permeated a large segment of American higher education—on campus and off. They manifest themselves in the forms of grade inflation, instructional laziness, easy assessments of transfer credits, guilt-driven allowances for minority status, incoherent academic requirements, and a variety of other laxities.

Some academic leaders and observers defend these and similar slippages, calling them the inevitable consequences of extending educational opportunity to more and more people, or a new "egalitarian" post-secondary education that is substituting for the "elitism" of the past. But surely there are way-stations between snobbery and slobbery. Equality and quality are not sworn enemies. Concern for standards is, in the last analysis, the only thing that gives academic credentials their meaning and their legitimate currency.

The following essay is devoted to a description and appraisal of college programs on military bases. It is a study of the problem of academic quality control in unusual (sometimes bizarre) settings.

The hope is not that readers will be led to condemn the military services and the colleges and universities serving military needs. Serious attempts are presently underway—in the services, in cooperating colleges and universities, and in relevant civilian agencies and associations—to correct the worst of the realities described in this essay. The hope is that the reader will see in this study an opening salvo of a war against academic shoddiness wherever and whenever it manifests itself in our society. As frightened professors compete for course enrollments, and as frightened administrators compete for a dwindling market of traditional students, there will be almost inexorable tendencies to lower academic standards even further. At the logical end of this drift are worthless academic credits leading to meaningless degrees. Whistles must be blown now—loudly and shrilly—if the granting of credentials is not to become totally meretricious.

If this report should lead military authorities and the Congress to starve or totally discontinue educational opportunities for military personnel, its meaning and intent would have been completely misinterpreted. Further undercutting of educational opportunities for service personnel could threaten the future of the All-Volunteer Force, weaken the mission-oriented preparation of the military, and remove men and women in the military services one step further from healthy civilian influences and viable long-term career opportunities. These are baneful and dangerous possibilities.

Neither the Department of Defense nor The Ford Foundation has endorsed the findings of this study, although the underlying research could not have been undertaken without the active assistance of both.

The following essay reflects the opinions of the author alone.

Stephen K. Bailey
Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 1, 1979

Preface

This essay stems from concerns that developed during the period 1973-77 when I served as Vice President of the American Council on Education. The concerns emanated from a growing suspicion that some aspects of one of the largest post-secondary educational systems in America—that associated with voluntary, off-duty opportunities for military personnel—might be getting out of hand. If this were in fact the case, it might mean that an increasingly large proportion of the universe of American post-secondary education might be allowing crucial aspects of their academic programs to be getting out of hand.

By "out of hand" I mean a condition where academic enterprises have broken the tethers of quality control, have proliferated educational services and academic credentialing at the price of galloping shoddiness. I am not referring here to non-licensed, non-accredited diploma mills. I am referring to the programs and practices of a significant number of duly accredited American colleges and universities that are presently selling academic credentials at cut rates in an increasingly cut-throat marketplace.

Too many serious scholars, educational administrators, association executives, conscientious military officials, and responsible officers of state and voluntary accrediting bodies have worked over the years to make academic credentials meaningful to permit the gradual unraveling of such hard-won standards without serious protest and without conscientious attempts to reverse disquieting trends.

Lest I be suspected of Ivy-League super-orthodoxy on matters academic, it should be noted that from 1968-73, as a member of the Board of Regents of the State of New York and as founder of the Regional Learning Service in Syracuse, I was a vocal advocate of non-traditional studies. I believed then, as I believe now, that education should be made available to an increasing number of citizens of all ages through arrangements that are flexible in time, space, and modes of delivery. And, as an American, I am enor-

mously proud of the pluralism that marks postsecondary education in this country—the number and diversity of academic levels, systems, programs, and offerings. Furthermore, I find most distinctions between "academic" skills, subjects, and courses, and "career-oriented" skills, subjects, and courses as fruitless as they tend to be invidious.

But early in the 1970's, I warned my academic colleagues in higher education that lurking at the bottom of the basket of shiny apples labeled "non-traditional studies" were some serpents. One of the serpents was "academic shoddiness."[1] Increasingly, I have cause to believe that this serpent has escaped and has been cloned —especially but not exclusively on military bases. It is not too late, I believe, to round up the slithering miscreants. But if this is to happen, academic and military officials must grab their forked sticks immediately and strike out with enterprise and persistence.

With these and related concerns in mind, I asked The Ford Foundation for a modest grant to enable me to work part-time, for the better part of a year, at mapping postsecondary education associated with military bases. I visited thirteen major military bases in the continental United States and in Hawaii; interviewed scores of education-service officers, top military brass, college representatives, and students; and read a library of ephemera (i.e. college catalogs, flyers, announcements, bulletins, contracts, forms, articles, hearings, reports, pamphlets, and a [very] few relevant books or monographs).

I am heartened by some of what I have found and profoundly disturbed by the remainder. Unfortunately, pat solutions to what is wrong do not leap immediately to mind. The very pluralism of American postsecondary education, revered traditions of academic autonomy, and the present weaknesses of both private and governmental monitoring, licensing, and accrediting agencies preclude easy answers to the question of what is awry. What is most heartening is that the military services themselves and relevant civilian authorities (public, institutional, and voluntary-associational) are now conscious of some of the major issues at stake and are working hard to resolve them. In a world of over-regulation, every attempt must be made to find ways of improving quality and efficiency without imposing counter-productive bureaucratic accountability systems on academic programs. I hope this study will assist these essential efforts.

I am indebted to those officers, enlisted men, civilian education directors, and college representatives who took time from busy schedules to arrange my interviews and class visits on several mili-

tary bases, and to answer my questions frankly and fully. I was greeted everywhere with courtesy and warm hospitality and was urged by many, with uncommon passion, to tell it as I found it.

I must acknowledge particular gratitude to John P. White, former Assistant Secretary of the Department of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, and to Col. Robert Zimmer, former Director of Postsecondary Education, Department of Defense (DOD). I am equally grateful to the top Washington-based education officers of the various services: Col. Robert Waggener (Army), Robert Quick (Air Force), Frances Kelly (Navy), and Lt. Col. John M. Keenan (Marines). Singly and together they smoothed the way for my field research, knowing full well that some of my findings might be embarrassing and unpalatable to the services they represented. I am also grateful for the advice and encouragement of Morris Janowitz, Benjamin T. Massey, Tilton Davis, Thomas Carr, Jerry Miller, John Sullivan, James Nickerson, William Maloy, Kenneth Young, and Morris Keeton.

Listing these few names only brings to mind the vast number of those not listed who helped me on my way.

Finally, my thanks to Mary Sullivan and Linda Harbig for a variety of logistical services, and to The Ford Foundation for its financial assistance.

Introduction

One of the largest post-secondary enterprises in America is under the jurisdiction of the Pentagon and its constituent military services. In size it must be compared to state systems like those of New York and California. The General Accounting Office estimates that 800,000 military personnel are presently enrolled part-time in college- or university-level courses purveyed on or near military bases in the continental United States and around the world.[2] Hundreds of post-secondary institutions are involved in this system—600 for the Army programs alone.[3] The Department of Defense's off-duty, post-secondary education budget for the system in 1978 was $86 million.[4]

The opportunity to pursue a college education during off-duty hours can be a rich one for military personnel. Uncle Sam pays at least three out of every four dollars of tuition. For veterans still in the service, the GI Bill frequently pays a substantial part of the whole cost—although unless present laws are amended, traditional GI benefits will have expired totally by 1989.[5]

Serious-minded service men and women find academic pursuits a relief from the often tedious routines of military life. Their in-service careers may be enhanced by academic credentials. For those looking ahead to a return to civilian status, credits earned through off-duty study are increasingly fungible in the civilian academic market. Of the half-billion dollars a year that the Pentagon spends on recruitment and advertising for the All-Volunteer Force, the portion spent on drawing attention to educational opportunities available during and following military service is believed by many to be a major factor in the services' approximating, meeting, or surpassing their enlistment quotas.[6]

The Problem

So many positive values appear to be associated with the concept of off-duty post-secondary education in the military services that it is painful to report that the present reality is shockingly

uneven. It is a *potpourri* of exciting fulfillments and shoddy rip-offs; rigorous standards and credit give-aways; careful supervision and no supervision; dedicated academic counselling and dreadful (or no) academic counselling; adequate academic facilities, miserable academic facilities; vigorous support from military brass, a back-of-the-hand from military brass; a fruitful articulation with military-skills training, a barren articulation with military-skills training.

More often than not the reality of military life is so far removed from recruitment promises that military recruiters have long been accused by enlisted personnel of being the used-car salesmen of the armed services. Unhappily, this complaint also applies to educational incentives. The military services have not developed a coherent and consistent philosophy of off-duty post-secondary opportunities. As a consequence, curricular offerings, financial resources, educational facilities, and logistical commitments are thin and uncertain. All too many civilian and military personnel associated with off-duty post-secondary programs, as educational service officers or educational counselors, are reluctant dragons or weary time-servers. Those who have real spark and/or any semblance of adequate professional qualifications stand out—partly because they are so few in number. Low pay levels for many education officers and associates are partly to blame.

These and other conclusions stem from thirteen reasonably in-depth visits by the author to military bases in the continental United States and Hawaii over a seven-month period in 1978,[1] and from conversations with knowledgeable officials in and around Washington, D.C.; in Pensacola, Florida (Headquarters of the Navy's Education and Training Command;) and in San Antonio, Texas (Headquarters of the Community College of the Air Force).

It must be stated at the outset that the four services vary in their approach to, and commitment to, off-duty post-secondary education.* The Air Force demonstrates the most visible and energetic commitment— if at times with a fervor for credentialism that risks the same kind of educational mediocrity that has long haunted graduate programs in education (i.e. the stimulation of lackluster courses and programs that are pursued by professionals for purposes of promotion only). The Navy, partly because of a lingering "John-Paul-Jones" mentality (i.e. uncritical traditional-

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*See Appendix A for a thumbnail sketch of the off-duty programs of the four services.

ism), partly because of the unfriendliness of the noise and motion of sea-duty toward serious academic work, has the lowest commitment to off-duty post-secondary education. Its best off-duty programs tend to be on stations removed from ports and ships. Both the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps show increasing interest in off-duty post-secondary educational opportunities for their personnel—this in spite of the fact that both services face the prodigious task of elevating the educational attainments of their numerous high-school-drop-out recruits to a pre-collegiate level.

But variations *within* services are far more impressive than variations *among* services. Each service has show-cases of high-quality collegiate- and university-level programs. Each service has examples of appallingly shoddy post-secondary offerings, as witnessed by this visiting educator.

Guidelines for Measuring Quality

It is important to state up front the principles and practices that, in the mind of the author, contribute to high-quality collegiate and university-level programs on military bases:

- Home campuses exert the same efforts and maintain the same standards and procedures in hiring instructional personnel off-campus as on-campus.

- Home campuses develop ways of insuring regular and frequent contact between campus-based faculty and administrators on the one hand, and off-campus representatives and instructional staff on the other.

- The monitoring of the quality of instruction on military bases is treated by the home campus as a special problem involving special evaluation techniques (e.g. externally normed examinations, peer visitations to classes, peer review of final-examination questions and answers on a spot basis). Student assessment of faculty performance is considered, by itself, an inadequate measure of instructional quality.

- The admission of a particular college or university to serve a particular military base is made by the commanding officer upon recommendation of the education services officer only after a disinterested external academic advisory team (working with military officials) has advised as to the integrity of the total on-base post-secondary offerings and the quality of the off-campus programs currently or prospectively offered by the applying college or university.

- Fees and tuition charged by the college or university for on-base educational programs are equitable, in line with charges to non-military audiences, and provide for reasonable contributions to the on-base educational support system (e.g. classroom facilities, library materials, educational equipment, student counselling).

- Educational counsellors are appropriately educated and well-trained for their work so that military personnel receive a considered and balanced appraisal of the relationship of their educational abilities, accomplishments, and potentials to available course offerings and sound non-traditional credit opportunities.

- Education service officers (ESO's) are chosen not only on the basis of appropriate formal academic credentials, but on the basis of demonstrated and relevant experience with or in institutions of higher education. Where present civil-service schedules and job descriptions stand in the way of using such criteria, concerted pressures are being applied by military and educational authorities to change inadequate civil-service standards. Each service provides for the continuing mid-career, in-service training of its ESO's.

- Academic credit for military experience, correspondence courses, college-level examinations, and other non-traditional academic pursuits is given only when measured against carefully established and widely recognized and respected academic norms.

- The logistics of academic permissions and records are handled efficiently and without inordinate delays.

- Special pains are taken by participating institutions of post-secondary education to measure qualitatively the output of courses given in non-traditional modes (e.g. weekend courses, abbreviated terms, auto-tutorials) in order to insure that student learning per-credit-hour is similar to learning that takes place through more traditional arrangements.

- Libraries are adequate for the levels of academic programs permitted on base—especially upper-division and graduate offerings.

- Learning space and facilities (e.g. classrooms, laboratories, libraries, counselling space) are clean, well lighted, and conducive to intellectual pursuits.

- Sophisticated information systems exist to help the ESO's, counsellors, college representatives, and above all the military clients themselves, to know of available offerings and of new delivery systems and learning possibilities.

- Admissions standards to college and university courses purveyed on base are the same as on the home campus.
- Courses offered on base are related to needs on base and do not simply represent the interests of surplus instructional talent on the home campus.
- Private accrediting associations and appropriate government monitoring agencies are actively engaged in insuring the standards noted or implied above.

I found instances of academic programs on military bases where few if any of the above standards and behaviors are maintained. It is my considered judgment that the portrait of current practice reflects the paucity rather than the richness of existing quality control and logistical efforts.

In order to protect the anonymity of conscientious informants, I have not made invidious references to individual bases or college and university programs. However, I believe my generalizations are accurate and apply to a greater or lesser degree to all of the services.

Historical Background

Before moving into the body of the report, two kinds of mini-histories are essential background. The first is a brief chronicle of the military's developing interest in off-duty, post-secondary education. The second is the story of the recent emergence in the United States of non-traditional education—a development that has mightily affected the form and substance of post-secondary education available to the military in this country and abroad.

The Military and Education[8]

Off-duty postsecondary education for the military, is of course, a subset of military education generally. The need for the latter dates back to 1778 when George Washington, after the chilling winter at Valley Forge, saw the importance of basic education to soldier morale and effectiveness. During the 19th century, illiteracy among military recruits was a continuing problem, and Congress made provision for military-post schools to overcome this inadequacy. At the officer level, the Service academies at West Point and Annapolis were created early in the history of the Republic to insure an educated officer corps for the Army and Navy. And the Army Reorganization Act of 1886 ". . . led to the establishment of college-level courses responsive to the Army's concern for increased professionalism among officers."[9] Ultimately, ROTC programs, the existing panoply of staff colleges and specialized military colleges and institutes, and various officer-oriented fellowship programs on university campuses became logical extensions or derivatives of the Act of 1866.

It was not until World War I, with the passage of the Mobilization Act of 1916, that Congress set ". . . the basis for establishing large-scale soldier education programs at the college level in overseas areas."[10] And it was not until World War II and the passage of the Mobilization Act of 1941 that a General Educational Development Program emerged as an essential ingredient of Army activities. The General Educational Development Program empha-

sized high-school level achievements, but included through the USAFI (United States Armed Forces Institute) opportunities for college-level work via correspondence courses.

In the post-World War II years, with the military becoming more complex technologically and more far flung geographically, new programs emerged to facilitate and foster postsecondary education on or near military bases. Education became more than a "morale factor" or an indoctrination service. In some of the armed services, it was recognized as having consequence for the success of military programs and missions. By the late 1950's, military adult-education programs, with the assistance of a number of American colleges and universities, were being offered on or near military bases around the globe.

With the coming of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, postsecondary educational opportunities for military personnel were viewed as positive incentives for recruitment and re-enlistment. An increasing number of colleges and universities saw in off-duty education a possibly lucrative source of income that would also involve them in a valued educational service.

By 1978, more than 800,000 service people were enrolled in post-secondary courses and programs on or near military bases around the world (and on the high seas)—courses and programs purveyed mainly through extension services or branch ("satellite") campuses of hundreds of American colleges and universities.

The Non-traditional Studies Movement[11]

Recent educational developments within the military have taken place in the context of historic changes in American postsecondary education itself. Although presaged by degree-by-examination programs, correspondence courses, and extension programs dating back into the 19th century, the moves in the United States in the late 1960's and early 1970's toward "non-traditional studies," "external degrees," "open universities," "credit by examination," "experiential learning," and "life-long learning," represented genuine innovations in the direction and availability of American postsecondary education. Based on the eminently plausible assumption that people can learn in a variety of ways and contexts (even, as the late Dean Acheson put it, "At their mother's knee and and other low joints"), and that people should receive academic credits and even degrees on the basis of demonstrated knowledge and performance rather than on the basis simply of the number of classroom hours spent on academic campuses, the "non-traditional" movement has spread widely in the course of

a decade. Pioneered in this country by the Union of Experimenting Colleges and Universities, the Regents External Degree Program in New York, Empire State College (State University of New York), the College Level Examination Program of the College Assistance Examination Board, the Commission on Non-Traditional Study, the Cooperative Assessment of Experiential Learning, and the American Council on Education's Office on Educational Credit, various forms of "open education" have reached into all aspects of American life. The great innovators, often supported by major philanthropic institutions like the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation and the Kellogg Foundation, have included Cyril O. Houle, Morris T. Keeton, Ewald B. Nyquist, Don Nolan, Samuel B. Gould, Jerry Miller, Thurnon Whilt, Stan Drazeck, Ernest L. Boyer, Francis U. Macy, Norman Kurland, and James Hall—although the list of individuals now connected with the movement has grown so large that an up-to-date roster of key actors would be beyond the scope and capacity of this essay.

The important point is that it is inconceivable that the elaborate apparatus of postsecondary education now existing on and near military bases could have developed apart from the non-traditional movement. The movement has given legitimacy to academic credit apart from traditional residency requirements, academic credit by examination, academic credit for certain types of life experience, and enhanced inter-institutional articulations and credit-transfer arrangements. It has given new life to the concept of academically sanctioned equivalencies for various in-service training courses in industry as well as in the military—a concept pioneered by the American Council on Education thirty years ago.

A wide variety of efforts has gone into the development of safeguards to insure that non-traditional programs preserve essential and traditional standards and attributes of academic quality. When such safeguards are adopted (e.g. giving credit for experience only when the experience has been assessed according to widely accepted academic criteria), the flexibilities and opportunities of non-traditional studies are not the enemy of academic quality. But when the quality-control issue has not been up front, the mid-wives and mentors of service-related, non-traditional movements—including those associated with off-duty postsecondary education—have been allowed to cut themselves adrift prematurely from traditional moorings of academic quality control. This phenomenon is increasingly troublesome in the civilian academic marketplace. But the dangers seem to be especially exacerbated by the military hunger for formal credentialing in environments that frequently promote academic corner-cutting.

And, as shall be observed below at greater length, the non-traditional movement on and off military bases has run far beyond the proven capacity of traditional accrediting, licensing, and eligibility-determining agencies to monitor effectively. Present attempts to remedy this ineffectiveness are heartening but still far from adequate.

The Present Reality

On major U. S. military bases throughout the world visitors are frequently startled to find evidence of a number of American colleges and universities. The evidence often takes the form of Quonset huts, converted barracks, or other temporary military buildings; college representatives are rarely awarded commodious office space. Representatives of a dozen or more postsecondary institutions may be housed together in a small "Education Building" presided over by a military or civilian "Education Service Officer" (ESO). Sometimes the loose amalgam of on-base collegiate satellites takes on a tongue-in-cheek unity. "Old Reliable U" at Fort Lewis, Washington, and "Tropic Lightening University," at Scholfield Barracks, Hawaii, are two examples.

An increasing number of colleges and universities represented on base come from the locality, as extension services of a neighboring community college, a local branch of the State University, or a local private four-year liberal arts college. But no matter where the military base is located, a substantial number of the postsecondary institutions represented may have their home campuses hundreds or thousands of miles away. For overseas bases this is, of course, inevitable. The presence of the University of Maryland in Western Europe or some constituent part of the Los Angeles Community College District in the Pacific Theater is hardly to be wondered at. What is startling is to find El Paso Community College from Colorado (now Pikes Peak Community College) purveying educational courses at Pope Air Force Base (North Carolina); St. Leo's College (Florida) and the Chicago City-Wide College with programs or administrative offices on the Naval Base at Norfolk, Virginia; Central Michigan University and the University of Southern California at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Golden Gate University (California) and Southern Illinois University at the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point (North Carolina); Central Texas College and Northern Colorado University at the Naval stations in the San Diego (California) area; U. S. Interna-

tional University (California) and Chapman College (California) at McChord Air Force Base (Washington); and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (Florida) and Pepperdine University (California) at the Naval Air Station in Memphis, Tennessee.

Who Gets on Base?

Such anomalies are explained by a combination of history, aggressive marketing, and occasional cronyism. Historically, many military bases have been treated as pariahs by neighboring colleges and universities. In some cases, ESO's have pleaded with local state institutions or private colleges to make their courses available on base. As often as not, local institutions have considered extension work on military bases "beneath them," or have been faced with the loss of national professional accreditation if they offered, say, a Business Administration degree on a part-time basis off campus. Pressed by the Pentagon to extend off-duty collegiate opportunities on base, ESO's can hardly be blamed for turning to distant institutions that agree to cooperate by offering a variety of courses wherever and whenever needed.

In many cases, the agreement of institutions to export themselves has been motivated by a genuine desire to be of service. For example, an institution's extension division may have entered the military field through services to a neighboring base. This service may have been valued and deemed successful by all concerned. Word-of-mouth then may have spread the news to ESO's on more distant bases. The ESO's, in turn, then may have petitioned the institution to open satellite campuses on their bases. Before long, a local college may become an academic empire with satellites on U.S. military bases around the globe.

This benign pattern of diffusion has on many occasions been abetted by aggressive marketing by the home campus, by service cronyism, and occasionally by clumsy attempts at bribery. Put in cynical terms, educational entrepreneurs smell money for educational services. There are instances of retired military officers being hired to approach ESO's or base commanders to sell them on a new academic program. On occasion, a new college or university is created *de novo* with the military market largely in mind. One such college has had a half-dozen retired generals on its board of advisers. Another freshly minted university was able, through flagrant cronyism, to secure the right to establish plush quarters for its college representative on a crowded naval base. Since the question of what colleges will be allowed on base is up to the commanding officer, who often accepts the recommenda-

tions of his ESO, the opportunity for military cronyism, political influence by powerful members of Congress on behalf of colleges in their Congressional districts, or the special cultivation (or worse) of ESO's by sharp collegiate salesmen are omnipresent dangers. (One admiral I interviewed pooh-poohed the possibility of cronyism. "I have never seen anyone presently in command ever do *anything* for someone formerly in command but now retired." This kind of statement belies realities that go beyond coincidence —as well as the testimony of troubled ESO's who have seen military cronyism at work first hand.)

In some ways, the most troublesome doubts about the presence on base of specific colleges and universities are fostered by the backgrounds and mind-sets of ESO's themselves. Some are military officers, as in the Marine Corps. But most ESO's and supporting educational counselors are civilians—civil-service employees of the various service departments. They come from a wide range of backgrounds. Although most have some kind of educational experience and educational credentials, few have had extensive exposure to curricular planning or academic counseling in post-secondary educational institutions. The peculiar hierarchical arrangements and divisions of labor in the military give many ESO's an extraordinary amount of personal power, discretion, and authority over educational matters. Some ESO's become arrogant and make it clear to college representatives that their tenure on base is a matter of the ESO's sufferance. More frequently, a combination of professional insecurity and perceived role leads ESO's to evaluate the worth of college and university programs through strangely myopic eyes. When I asked one ESO how he decided which colleges to allow on base, he responded: "By how much credit they'll give for military experience, military training courses, and CLEP and DANTES examinations."

The evidence seems clear that many colleges and universities are on military bases because they have agreed to listen carefully to ESO signals of acceptable conduct. Unfortunately, such signals rarely represent considered academic judgments about maintaining a balanced curriculum or high and rigorous academic standards. Far more frequently the issue is how far the exporting institution will go in accommodating the peculiar needs, schedules, itinerancies, and intermittencies of military life. Some accommodation is essential; beyond a certain point, however, academic quality is being bartered away for an extra buck. Few ESO's are schooled in the niceties of academic credentialing.

ESO's defend their position by placing the burden of maintain-

ing academic quality upon the civilian institutions and agencies that are supposed to worry about such matters. But, as shall be noted later, few of these civilian institutions and agencies have really been geared to the demands of monitoring satellite campuses on military bases. The discretion allowed to individual colleges to bargain with individual ESO's and to undercut immediate academic competition is substantial. One university that does business on a number of military bases allows 30 semester hours of credit, not for military training courses or other academically evaluated experience, but for a simple four-year hitch in any of the military services Such bartering away of academic credit is obscene; but it is the logical extension of a system that permits an academic contract to be negotiated, in effect, by a single ESO with individual (and competing) colleges and universities—and that does not guarantee that the accreditation of a given institution represents high standards off-campus (or, for that matter, *on*-campus).

It should be noted that institutions with home campuses reasonably proximate to a military base (e.g. local community colleges, state institutions, private colleges and universities) have built-in advantages in insuring carefully supervised extension programs for the benefit of the armed services. Some local institutions are conscientious in this respect. However, I found overall no substantial difference between the quality of academic programs purveyed by nearby, as distinguished from distant, colleges and universities.

In the final analysis, base commanders and ESO's make trouble for themselves both by not securing outside, respected academic advisory assistance in selecting the colleges and universities (local or distant) to be allowed on base, and by ill-defining the scope and mix of their academic programs.

What Is Offered and Taught, and by Whom?

The military services spend half a billion dollars a year in active-force recruitment—$74 million on "Enlisted Recruiting Advertising" alone.[12] Part of this advertising campaign addresses the educational benefits associated with military service.

The benefits are subtantial. At the post-secondary level, they include:

- ROTC scholarships (up to four years of college with a four-year indenture)
- Educational Assistance Program (a two-for-one matching grant

for an individual's savings dedicated to college or vocational edution after the individual leaves the service)

- Tuition Assistance Program (the Government pays three out of every four dollars for tuition for post-secondary classes taken on base)
- G I Bill payments (until the fund runs out in 1989)
- Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (for those who meet the means test)

This study is concerned only with the last three. Even so, the stated opportunities for a variety of post-secondary courses and degrees are formidable. A random and cursory listing of programs available to the military through off-duty, on-base study includes:[18]

- Associate degrees in Business Administration, Public Administration, Management, Radiological Technology, General Studies, Food-Service Management, Technology, Liberal Arts, Accounting, Criminal Justice, Aeronautical Studies, Drafting and Design Technology, General Office Technology, Maintenance Engineering Technology, Nursing, Pre-Business, Pre-Education, Law Enforcement.
- Baccalaureate degrees in Political Science, Sociology, Aeronautical Studies, Industrial Technology, Business Administration, Music Education, Health Sciences, General Studies, Individual Studies, Criminology, Real Estate, Business Administration, Human Resources Administration, Occupational Education, Law and Justice, Aviation Maintenance Management, Aviation Operations Management.
- Master's degrees in Music, Administrative Services, Counselor Education, Political Science, Counseling Psychology, Systems Management, Systems Technology, Acoustics, Education, Adult and Community College Education, Business Administration, Fluid Mechanics and Thermal Sciences, Public Administration, Human Resources Management, General Administration, Master of Arts Individualized (sic), Criminial Justice Administration.
- Ph.D. in Leadership and Human Behavior.

In addition, service men and women on many bases have available a variety of credit and not-for-credit courses that are not explicitly related to a particular degree program.

The smörgasbörd of available educational offerings, in short, is extraordinary. It is also highly variegated in quality. At one extreme are courses that are identical to those offered on the home campus—courses taught by an institution's tenured professors. At the other extreme are courses and programs specially tailored to

perceived career aspirations of the military and taught by part-time, marginally credentialed teachers hired "off-the-street." Unfortunately, the latter practice is clearly in the ascendency. Time and again, when I asked college representatives about their on-base faculty, I was told that they were part-time "moon-lighters." Sometimes a single instructor teaches a particular course for three separate colleges. In vocational, pre-professional, and professional fields, instructional staffs tended almost invariably to be practitioners during the day: auto mechanics, lawyers, businessmen, accountants, aviation mechanics, etc. Some *nouveau riche* universities make an absolute virtue of their non-professorial instructional staff, stressing the absence of long-haired professors and the virtues of being taught by people who are "successful practitioners." One university offering a Ph.D. to servicepersons advertises that "Rather than serving a number of years as *apprentices to a professor*, the candidates spend time in course work and research which prepare them for a continuing and growing leadership role." (emphasis supplied). This kind of gratuitous and defensive comment simply underscores the insecurity of the university in question and increases outside suspicions about the university's academic competence and integrity.

One cannot escape the sense that the hiring, caring, and feeding of part-time, on-base faculty by distant home campuses is frequently *pro forma* and slap-dash. A typical pattern seems to begin with the advertising of an available on-base teaching post in local newspapers and occasionally in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* or *The New York Times*. Applicants write or call for application forms. Returned forms are sent by the on-base college representative to the home campus, where a department chairman or an academic dean gives them a review that may be either systematic or cursory. If the formal credentials seem to be adequate (an M.A. or doctorate for baccalaureate and graduate-level courses), the batch of application forms is returned to the on-base college representative, who then is at liberty to select any of those whose applications have been "approved." Some responsible colleges and universities go beyond this: they insist that all potential instructional staff be interviewed by appropriate faculty and/or administrators of the home campus. But this is a time-consuming and expensive operation, and many post-secondary institutions indulge in the short-cuts noted above. Sometimes even the short-cuts are short-cut. On one base, I found that an instructor in auto mechanics with only an associate degree and no previous teaching experience had been hired by a college representa-

tive who bought gas at the filling station where the instructor worked as a semi-skilled utility mechanic.

I asked a sailor-student at a seaport Navy base how he liked his professor in Criminal Justice (a full-time lawyer hired as a part-time instructor by a recently created university whose business is largely that of serving the needs of the military). The student replied, "Great! This is no theoretical prof. You know what we did last week? We actually visited a *courtroom!*" When I asked whether the course required a term paper, he said, "You bet! We had to write a three-page term paper on 'Our Day in the Courtroom'!"

I visited a class in English Composition aboard a ship tied up at an important Navy base. The part-time instructor was in her late 20's and had an M.A. in English from a state college. She attempted to diagram a sentence, became hopelessly confused, and finally said to the bewildered sailors, "Well, fellows, it looks like we get to learn it all together!"

In fairness, I visited some on-base classes taught by part-time instructor who had minimal academic credentials—classes that were pedagogically superb. I remember particularly one class on "Marriage and the Family" taught by a Navy chaplain. His was a brilliant piece of exposition and analysis.

The issue is not that the present instructional hiring patterns for courses taught on base uniformly deliver poor teachers. There are natural teachers who have not had formal pedagogic or scholarly training, just as there are Ph.D.'s who are pedagogically muscle-bound. But dedicated attention to careful procedures and high academic standards in the hiring of instructional staff is one mark of a first-rate institution of higher learning. I have found such dedication the exception rather than the rule on military bases I visited. There is therefore a vast unevenness in the quality of teaching found in the satellite programs of colleges and universities purveying educational services at military establishments. The fact that this generalization can also be made in reference to the home campuses of all institutions of higher education hides an essential point. Campus-based instruction takes place within a context of continuity, peer review, and rich library resources that can contain or compensate for instructional weaknesses. Such compensating amenities rarely exist on military bases. Part-time instructional staff on military bases rarely have any collegial contact with their home-campus departmental colleagues—or even with each other. Student evaluations of on-base pedagogy are sometimes effective in getting rid of scandalously bad teachers.

But students—even mature students—are notoriously generous in their appraisals of the effectiveness of all but the worst of instructional staff.

Instructional quality is particularly uneven on many military bases because of curricular deviations from traditional academic norms. Some of the irregularities have been noted in the proliferated subject matter of available academic degrees. An associate degree in "Liberal Arts" or "General Studies," a baccalaureate in "Individual Studies," a masters degree called "Master of Arts Individualized," a Ph.D. in "Leadership and Human Behavior," all may be carefully developed and rigorously monitored. But since they lack the bench-marks of traditional disciplines taught in traditional institutions, they are open to the suspicion of being cheap degrees based on whimsical combinations of "gut" courses.

Substantive "non-traditionalism" on-base is often accompanied by procedural "non-traditionalism"—flexible "delivery patterns" that try to conform to the harsh realities of military life. The fact is that most military enlistments are for a reasonably short duration—three to four years. Furthermore, most military assignments to particular locations are by nature relatively short-term and interruptable. The military services place a high premium, therefore, on college-level, on-base courses that can be taught at convenient intervals and at convenient times, and that permit flexible "make-up" arrangements in the case of course interruptions. Six-, eight-, or ten-week courses are preferred to semester-long (16-week) courses. Intensive week-end programs twice a month are often preferred to programs with class schedules that call for two evenings each week. In consequence, there is a degree of academic-scheduling experimentation on military bases that at times reaches bizarre levels. Traditionally, for example, a three-semester-hour college credit involves three contact hours a week over fifteen or sixteen weeks, or a total of forty-five to forty-eight contact hours. And theoretically, if one attends class intensively for eight hours a day on six consecutive Saturdays and Sundays, one could earn three hours credit in three weekends—or, if the classes are held every other week, over a six-week period. But this assumes: (1) that the same level of learning occurs for all subjects taught in intensive as opposed to traditional schedules; (2) that the higher motivation and maturity of service-connected adults corrects for any academic shortfalls connected with scheduling changes; and/or (3) that preparation time (traditionally two-to-three hours for each hour of classroom contact) is realistic for

those on military assignment under the weekend-intensive schedule. A sixteen-hour intensive weekend classroom schedule would presumably be informed by 32-48 hours of preparation, or three-to-five hours a night over a two-week period. Furthermore, if a weekend schedule for intensive classes is interrupted by a temporary duty assignment or other emergency, a student has lost a third of his contact hours for a three-hour course.

For an heroic few, such hurdles may be negotiable. It stretches academic credibility to the point of breaking, however, to pretend that the average serviceperson can derive as much academic benefit from classes taught in accordance with such accommodating scheduling as classes taught less intensively over longer periods of time. One way to prove or disprove such a proposition would be to develop or borrow widely standardized subject-matter tests in familiar courses and see where those taking weekend courses on military bases fall on the grading curve. But when I broached such a possibility with ESO's or college representatives, I was told that external examinations would be an "infringement of academic freedom." It would be news to Oxford and Swarthmore that external exams constitute such a threat.

The Accumulation of Credit

Granted the brevity and itinerancies of most military tours of duty, it might be considered unreasonable to expect that most military personnel could complete even a two-year associate degree, let alone a four-year baccalaureate degree, on a part-time basis during their military stints. But thousands do each year. The explanation, of course, is that in addition to the credits they receive for classes attended and examinations taken on-base, servicepersons may receive academic credit for a variety of other educational and educative experiences.

First of all, they may receive academic credit for basic training (e.g. two credit hours towards a "Physical Education" requirement; or one credit hour for "Personal Hygiene"). They almost certainly will receive academic credit for service courses in various military skills. Generally, the credit-granting process follows what is known as the *ACE Guide*.[14] Shortly after World War II, the American Council on Education set up a system for reviewing military training offerings in terms of possible equivalencies with college-level courses. Originally known as CASE (Council for the Accreditation of Services Experiences), the present review activities are under ACE's Office on Educational Credit. Teams of professors

from relevant fields are asked to review the syllabi of military training courses, visit training courses, talk with skills instructors on base, and recommend the number of college credits that might be legitimately awarded for the successful completion of individual training courses. So, for example, a service-connected training course in *Electrical Engine Maintenance* might receive an ACE recommendation of two semester hour credits in *Basic Electricity*.

The *ACE Guide to the Evaluation of Educational Experiences in the Armed Services*, issued periodically since 1945, is a formidable document containing thousands of recommended equivalencies between military-skills courses and college credits. No one is forced to accept the *ACE Guide* recommendations, but in fact they are widely accepted by academic institutions throughout the country. It is hardly to be wondered that *ACE Guide* recommendations are enthusiastically viewed on military bases as a major reservoir of transfer credits to speed the serviceperson on his/her academic way.

Transfer credit is also awarded, sometimes too liberally, for credits earned by examination and by correspondence courses. The most frequently used instruments of credit by examination are the College Level Examination Program (CLEP) tests developed by the Educational Testing Service, and the Subject Standardized Tests of the Defense Activity for Non-traditional Education Support (DANTES) issued from Pensacola, Florida. CLEP, which is administered logistically for military services through DANTES, features general examinations in major collegiate academic divisions or basic subject matter areas: English Composition, Humanities, Natural Sciences, Social Sciences/History, and Mathematics, as well as a series of examinations in more specialized disciplines. CLEP examinations are constructed by teams of respectable academicians and are normed. But the American Council on Education recommends awarding full credit to those who pass CLEP exams above the lowest quartile. To many this is an unconsionably low cut-off point even for a highly respected series of exams. Some post-secondary institutions operating on military bases insist, to their credit, upon CLEP scores at the 50th percentile or above for purposes of credit transfer. Some colleges award up to 64 credit hours (more than half of a baccalaureate degree) for a successful completion of a battery of CLEP examinations. Other colleges will accept credit for CLEP-oriented cram courses in addition to awarding credit for passing the CLEP exams themselves. Such uses and abuses of the CLEP instrument are questionable to say the least.

The DANTES Subject Standardized Tests include approximately seventy-five subject examinations. They are based on textbooks frequently used in college courses.

A third and growing battery of subject-matter tests is offered by the *ACT Proficiency Examinations* made available through the DANTES Examination Program Division of the American College Testing Program.

DANTES also disseminates information about regional, state, and institutional tests that may be taken by servicepersons for academic credit.

Credit through correspondence courses is a far more controversial issue, partly because of the sorry record of many profit-oriented home-study enterprises. Being a correspondence-course salesman on a military base can be a sordid and sullen occupation. On one large Army base I found that a correspondence-course salesman successfully approached a guard of the Army brig. The guard sold over $50,000 worth of correspondence courses to his prisoners and split his commissions with the salesman. The National Home Study Council tries to monitor correspondence courses and to accredit only the purveyors of responsible ones. But this an horrendous task, and the opportunities for cheating on even the most carefully developed and administered correspondence courses are prodigious.

From World War II until 1974, the major agency for making correspondence courses available to military personnel was USAFI. Rocked by charges of redundancy and ineptitude, USAFI was discontinued in 1974 and was replaced by DANTES. DANTES periodically issues a *Directory of Independent Study College and University Courses,* for which DANTES acts as broker through a *DANTES Independent Study Application Form.* The DANTES *Directory* runs more than 100 pages, lists hundreds of colleges and universities, and more than 1800 subject-matter areas available in the form of correspondence courses.

The list is staggering: "Agriculture" includes more than eighty separate course offerings; "Accounting" contains over 100 listings offered by 40 different colleges or universities. A random selection of academic fields includes Journalism, Computer Programming, Educational Psychology, Health Education, Language Arts Education, Engineering, Art History and Appreciation, Theater Arts, Rehabilitation and Therapeutic Technology, Child Development, Classic Greek, Comparative Literature, French, Israeli, Literature (over 400 listings), Persian, Commercial Law, Library Science, Mathematics, Atmospheric Science and Meteorology Evolution,

Physics, Christianity, Safety Education, Black-American Studies, Economics, History (500 listings), Criminology, Sociology, Food Service, and Zoology.

Alas, the richness of the smörgasbörd is marred by uneven quality and by a staggering (up to 80 percent) rate of attrition—many pay for the intellectual food but never finish their plate.

Some colleges limit transfer credits from correspondence courses to 9 to 12 hours. Less fastidious institutions will allow up to 60 hours credit or more. Some postsecondary institutions give substantial credit for "experience"—a practice increasingly acceptable within conservative limits if appropriate safeguards and academic equivalencies are established. But I have already noted one institution that gives up to 30 credits to the serviceperson who has completed a four-year military stint. Too frequently, "credit-for-experience" is used as a bargaining tactic in the recruiting arsenal of college respresentatives.

Finally, of course, transfer credits are accepted from accredited colleges and universities for courses completed by servicepersons before enlistment.

Even with the liberal granting of credit transfers and credit awards for experience, the degree requirements of most colleges and universities would not be attainable through on-base postsecondary programs were it not for the extraordinary slackening of traditional residency requirements. An increasing number of colleges and universities count courses taken on-base as meeting home-campus residency requirements. Some colleges have no residency requirements whatsoever. This is preeminently the case with the New York State Regents External Degree Program and comparable non-traditional-studies-awards programs in other states. To receive an associate degree or a baccalaureate degree from the Regents External Degree Program, one may simply submit test results, credit-transfers, and other evidence of subject-matter mastery. These are evaluated according to standards established by the academic community. If degree standards are satisfied and appropriate fees are paid, then degrees are awarded. The New York State Regents External Degree Program, accredited by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, has already granted academic degrees to over 4,000 military personnel. On base, the trend is toward minimal or no residency requirements on the home-campus of participating postsecondary institutions.

In sum, a combination of liberality in credit transfers, credit by examination and experience, and the slackening or abolition of

residency requirements provides military personnel with a highly flexible set of options for reaching academic-degree status. At its best, this flexibility is a godsend to itinerant military personnel. Unfortunately, academic standards may slip seriously in the process.[15] In order to attract tuition or degree fees, colleges may outbid one another in their liberality of acceptance of non-traditional credits. In many cases, prerequisite requirements (the concept of mastering one course before being allowed into a more advanced course) may not be enforced. The whole concept of curriculum balance (the integration of general education and specialized professional or disciplinary competences) is already seriously compromised. And there is a marked distortion of academic offerings on base. Laboratory sciences, for example, are rarely if ever available on military bases. Humanities courses, especially in the arts, philosophy, and literature, are rarely available to military personnel. ESO's argue that there is not a demand for the latter. Participating colleges argue that basic distribution requirements can be met by CLEP exams or through other means. But there seems to be a strong presumption on military bases that a college education has no meaning apart from scattered, consumer-driven, vocationally oriented courses. Tuition-hungry colleges, viewing extension courses on military bases as a revenue-producing enterprise, are unlikely to give more than lip-service to curriculum balance as a fundamental aspect of collegiate education.

In my various visits to military bases, I found not a single ESO or college representative who was seriously concerned with the larger purposes and meaning of college degrees. Most looked upon themselves as brokers and registrars for a system, a complex educational apparatus that, with a little imagination and astute bargaining, could be made to deliver consumer-driven academic credentials at cut-rate.

To understand what "cut-rate" means, one need only look at the requirements set by the Navy for a college to become a member of the Navy Campus for Achievement Program. Eighteen colleges and universities were a part of NCFA when I was doing my research. To become a member of NCFA, a college or university had to agree to:

(1) No residency requirements
(2) Up to 75 percent of learning through non-traditional means
(3) Liberal acceptance of transfer credit
(4) A planned program of courses
(5) Ensured credit transfer
(6) Ten years to complete degree

(7) Centralized transcript maintenance
(8) Annual review of transcript.

I asked one ESO why, since there was no residency requirement in any case, a student would choose one of the eighteen colleges over another. He replied, "Some offer some subjects but not others; and, then of course, we shop around to see which colleges will offer the most credit for Navy training courses and experiential learning."

In such an environment, it is difficult to know where a healthy "flexibility" ends and educational "rip-offs" begin.

Counseling

As noted earlier, educational counseling on military bases is handled by education service officers and their staff and by college representatives. The former may be civil-service employees or specially assigned military personnel. On a large base (e.g. Ft. Bragg, N.C.), the education service officer may have a counseling and support staff of up to eighty civilians. Aboard ship, the education counseling staff is usually the last junior officer aboard.

By and large, few ESO's or college representatives have suitable backgrounds for the educational counseling of adults. Where they do they are frequently inadequate in number to serve the relevant military population. For some aspects of counseling, these limitations may not be of great moment. A large part of counseling on many military bases deals with the mechanics of financial aid (tuition assistance, G.I. Bill, Basic Education Opportunity Grants, etc.), the logistics of credit records, and the filling out of forms and applications. On many bases, counseling includes the administration of standardized tests—an indispensable, if routine function. The problems arise in areas of serious academic substance: granted a student's background, record, ability, and aspirations, and granted the variety of educational opportunities available on base through courses, self instruction, and tests, what should he or she be advised to take, with what preparation, and according to what schedule?[16]

ESO's and their immediate staffs are frequently so harrassed by general management problems (e.g. budgets, reports, space, facilities, new directives from above) that they lack adequate time for serious educational counseling. Students are therefore frequently referred for counseling purposes to on-base college representatives. Since the latter have a direct vested interest in signing students up (some college representatives are actually paid on a

commission basis), the objectivity of educational counseling, even when, as in the rarest of cases, it is informed by appropriate professional qualifications, is at best suspect. Furthermore, the presence on base of a number of competing colleges and universities increasingly induces military personnel to search for cut-rate offerings: i.e. low tuition, maximum credits for military experience, no- or low-residency requirements, etc. Counseling too often becomes an indecent bargaining session where applicants probe for the "best deal." Unfortunately, the "best deal" may turn out to be, in academic terms, a "bum steer."

In more than thirty years of association with college and universities in this country and abroad, I have never seen academic counseling done supremely well. It is frequently done haphazardly and uncritically by academic staff who lack appropriate motivation or credentials. But in general, I am constrained to note that the on-base educational counseling of military personnel is qualitatively a series of rank orders below that which is normally available on home campuses. Civilian ESO budgets are so frequently starved, military ESO's and their staffs are so frequently unqualified or preoccupied, and college representatives are so frequently untrained or institutionally biased that good educational advice is rare indeed.

Facilities

College-program educational facilities on (or near) military bases consist of offices for ESO's and their staff, space for college representatives, libraries, testing rooms, classrooms, and storerooms for instructional material and equipment. On most of the bases visited, the quality of such educational facilities (judged by comparable civilian facilities) is mediocre to miserable. The exceptions tend to obtain on bases that are already oriented toward advanced training of military specialists, or where the sheer operational genius of a talented ESO has served to con facilities and equipment from the base commander, military training supervisors, participating colleges and universities, or nearby school distracts.

Generally, I found education headquarters buildings crowded and understaffed; college representatives bunched together in bull-pens or limited to tiny cubicles; libraries woefully inadequate for all except lower-division collegiate offerings; classrooms badly lighted and ventilated; and instructional materials and equipment outdated in both quality and quantity. By and large, space and re-

sources for the administering of tests seemed to me more adequate than any of the other academic appurtenances.

Most base commanders, of course, will argue that *most* military facilities suffer egregiously from overcrowding and deferred maintenance. But few base commanders would argue that off-duty education is at the top of their budgetary priorities. In consequence, on-base college programs often are left with the dregs of what is available in the way of space and equipment. Good space and equipment cannot necessarily be equilibrated to good education. But surely there are minimal standards for space and facilities, related to the administrative and instructional aspects of collegiate programs. Even allowing for the often harsh military environment and for the inevitable pecking order of military priorities, off-duty facilities are in general shockingly inadequate and frequently counterproductive as appropriate learning environments. And few colleges seem interested in using their often-high revenues from military tuition to improve on-base educational facilities and equipment.

The Navy's PACE program (Program of Afloat College Education) is perhaps the most extreme case of inadequate facilities. Classrooms and study facilities on most ships are non-existent or primitive. Almost all are *ad hoc*. Navy ships are congenitally noisy; their mysterious parts creak and clank, and loud-speaker systems, sirens, and whistles produce an omnipresent cacophony. On smaller craft, the incessant roling and pitching can distract even the most seasoned sailor student as he tries to read his books or write papers. Occasionally, under energetic leadership, the large "cities afloat," the aircraft carriers, find instructional space and study cubicles reasonably adequate for those pursuing college-level courses. Adventuresome professors are sometimes lured aboard ship for a successful instructional tour en route to the Mediterranean or the Far East. But my observations and interviews on ships and at navy ports (and my memories of three years as a Navy officer in World War II) lead me to conclude that the existing PACE program is generally not conducted in an environment conducive to academic learning. In my estimation, the Navy would be far better advised to phase out 90 percent of the PACE program and to put the money saved into better educational facilities located in the ports where ships linger between sea assignments. It is possible that creative use of video cassettes, audio cassettes, small computers and other self-instructional devices could overcome some of the facilities-lacks aboard ship.[17] But most academic institutions have been wary of giving credit for unsupervised auto-

instruction. Unless there is a creative and acceptable breakthrough along these lines, the PACE program as it presently exists should be discontinued, except in those few and proven cases when a proper academic learning environment can be created.

In more general terms, the military and the Congress should pay far more attention to ensuring adequate support systems for off-duty, on-base collegiate education. Otherwise, the civilian academic and government community that ultimately establishes the standards for the conduct of academic programs will begin to question existing programmatic and credit articulations with the military. More important, military personnel will come to recognize that they are being cheated of the quality education they have been promised by military recruiting salesmen.

Quality Control: Whose Responsibility Is It?

The size and complexity of the armed forces, the astounding pluralism of American governance and American education, and strange myths about the nature of academic freedom, make the question of responsibility for academic quality control on military bases as elusive as it is important.

A plausible case can be made that any one, or a number of combinations of the following agents are responsible for quality control:

- The U. S. Congress
- The Office of the Secretary of Defense
- The Office of the Secretary of each of the Armed Services
- Various education "commands" of these several services
- Base or ship commanders
- Education service officers
- Participating colleges and universities
- State licensing and/or higher education coordinating bodies
- Associations of higher education and their specialized instruments (e.g. ACE/Office of Educational Credit; AASCU and AACJC /Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges)
- Federal agencies concerned with "eligibility" and/or with the monitoring of grants (DHEW, Veterans Administration, General Accounting Office)
- Regional and professional accrediting bodies

Unfortunately, the very plausibility of any or several of the above being agents responsible for quality control makes the likelihood of buck-passing inevitable.

Even if someone could find a way for all these entities and authorities to work together in symbiotic cooperation there would still be serious hiatuses in monitoring and enforcement mechan-

isms. Why this is so can be understood only after briefly reviewing the existing accountability systems.

The Congress

As an instrument for enforcing academic quality control on military bases, Congress is a half-blind and totally blunt instrument. While it is true that Congress passes the laws and raises the money that makes off-duty college programs available for military personnel, only a few national legislators are aware of the complexity of the issues in this arcane area of public policy. Furthermore, the most cursory review of Congressional attitudes and actions over the past decade related to educational programs for the military reveals a strange myopia. When confronted with evidence of corruption and rip-offs in educational services, Congressional reaction has been to kill programs rather than cauterize wounds. Surely one of the most thoughtless legislative acts in recent years was the killing of the so-called PREP program—a program of remediation for enlisted personnel who were high school dropouts. The ending of the GI Bill in the face of the need to enhance incentives for sustaining the All-Volunteer Force was both illogical and counterproductive. The Educational Assistance Program begun on January 1, 1977, which provides a two-to-one federal match for every dollar saved by military personnel toward post-service post-secondary education, is a totally inadequate surrogate for the GI Bill—especially on inflation-ridden overseas bases.

In addition, as budgets have become tighter, Congress has tended to take a narrower and narrower view of what constitutes "mission-oriented" military activity. Budgets for education and training, as a result, have tended to suffer vis-a-vis those for hardware and field deployments and operations.

Suffice it to be noted here that most members of the United States Congress have no exposure to or interest in the issues discussed in this report.

This is unfortunate. A clear Congressional understanding of the issues at stake in off-duty collegiate-level education on military bases, and a related development of appropriate manpower policies for the All-Volunteer Force, could exercise enormous leverage on the academic quality of the entire system. What is presently needed is not a full-dress Congressional review of the relationship of education to the military services, but considered Congressional attention to the reviews and recommendations of relevant military and academic authorities who are presently or prospectively at-

tempting to improve the quality and efficiency of on-base, off-duty academic programs.

The Department of Defense

In the complex structure of the Department of Defense, the clearest point of responsibility for the quality of academic programs on military bases is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics. The Secretary of Defense looks to this Assistant Secretary for leadership and advice on such matters. The top educational officers and education and training structures of the several services look to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower as a point of ultimate coordination and policy review.

But the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower has not, in the past, had the staff or the prioritized time to exercise direct influence over the quality of the collegiate programs on military bases, caught up as he is with conundrums in the macro-fields of manpower recruitment and deployment—especially including historic as well as new dilemmas surrounding the National Guard and the Reserves.[18] The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense has on occasion raised general questions about, and evidenced general interest in the subject matter of this report, but it has not been able to monitor academic quality at the retail level of ships and bases.

This is beginning to change. Recently the Assistant Secretary asked permanent and visiting staff to review the quality-control issue, to cooperate with the Commission on Postsecondary Accreditation in a series of case studies of on-base college programs, and to design accountability instruments (questionnaires, reports) that might identify academic and programmatic weaknesses on military bases in this country and overseas. These are all steps in the right direction, as long as the accountability instruments are not so burdensome and so statistically cumbersome that they produce a cure worse than the disease. And care must be taken to assure that the Pentagon does not itself become an academic accrediting body. DOD and the individual services can and should, however, look carefully at the contracts they negotiate with individual colleges and universities to ascertain that such contracts contain provisions consonant with the principles of good practice listed early in this report.

As far as the separate services are concerned, top education officers in each of the services stew about the quality-control issue. They are aware of horror stories. The Army, Navy, and Air Force

actually fund an annual conference of their respective ESO's for purposes of briefings and general exchange of ideas and concerns. Inspector General reports and other reviews of base operations occasionally touch on educational matters. Some service educational directors (those in the Marine Corps come conspicuously to mind) work at upgrading the educational background and in-service training of base ESO's. But off-duty education is so frequently viewed as peripheral to the central thrust of military activities and so much blind faith is placed in civilian accreditation agencies that little attention has been given by the services to monitoring the quality of on-base collegiate programs. To work on these frontiers adequately would call for budgets far beyond those presently available for the purpose. One single contribution that each service could make would be to define and to articulate the role of off-duty education in language that would command greater budgetary support (Executive and Congressional) for the function than presently obtains.

Base Commanders

In the hierarchical traditions of the military, base commanders are held responsible for what happens on their bases. It would seem clear, therefore, that accountability for the quality of academic programs on a particular military base should be pinpointed in the office of the base commander. In a formal sense, this notion has merit. By making certain kinds of demands and establishing certain kinds of procedures, a base commander can exercise important leverage on the quality of academic programs purveyed on his base. But up to now, the issue will rarely if ever have crossed his mind or desk. Running a large military base is an enormously complicated exercise. I asked one base commander what he did for a living. He replied, "I'm a goddamn *mayor!* Up to my ears in politics, running everything from fire departments, drug clinics, and playgrounds to truck maintenance centers and schools; and all this while trying to mount a responsible defense effort." In the field of off-duty collegiate education opportunities, base commanders normally and understandably defer to their ESO's.

If base commanders could sanction and orchestrate visiting academic/military advisory teams to assist them and their ESO's in defining adequate and responsible college-level programs for their bases, and in reviewing the standards and reputations of participatory postsecondary institutions, they could substantially help to improve academic quality control.

Education Service Officers

We have already noted some of the preoccupations, professional limitations, and mind-sets of base ESO's. The best of them do worry about quality control. Some are tough as nails in not permitting marginal institutions or programs on base. But all too many are far more concerned with the academic flexibility and the tuition costs of colleges and universities than with the range and quality of academic courses offered on base. "As long as an institution is 'accredited,' we're satisfied," is the general attitude. Working with their base commanders in soliciting qualified outside advice on matters academic could be an important point of leverage on issues of quality control.

Participating Colleges and Universities

When one shifts focus to the civilian academic world—to academic institutions themselves, and to their chartering, licensing, monitoring, and accrediting bodies, the accountability maze of quality control grows more complex.

Clearest responsibility for quality control would seem to fall on the participating colleges and universities. In some cases, this function is exercised with exquisite morality. In my study, I ran across heartening examples of strict and explicit academic standards, constant interaction between on-base programs and home-base faculty and administration, in-house as well as external on-base program reviews, systematic teacher evaluation, responsible consortial arrangements and other attempts at quality control. Unfortunately, the more systematic and elaborate the quality-control system, the more expensive it is for the institution to maintain off-campus programs. Some institutions (the University of Utah comes to mind), have come to the conclusion that they cannot mount quality programs to meet on-base military needs without placing unconscionable extra demands on their faculty and their administrative staffs. They are therefore totally disestablishing their educational services to the military.

The problem is at the other extreme: colleges and universities that see on-base services as a lucrative academic market that can be served at ridiculously low marginal costs with enormous profit to the home campus. Such institutions make little or no effort to monitor academic quality, or to establish a coherent educational philosophy. They charge what the market will bear and deliver educational services that are shoddy at best. They sell credits and degrees at cut rates.

Most colleges and universities that I witnessed on base were not quite at the "cheap-and-shoddy" end of the spectrum (there were a few). But the overwhelming majority seemed to be closer to the lax end than to the tightly controlled end—that is, they violated more than half of the principles articulated early in this report. Patently, there are things that participating colleges and universities can do. I have listed many of them as "good" principles in the early pages of this report. But in addition, colleges and universities can actively seek the help of their regional and professional accrediting associations, and of state coordinating and licensing authorities, in reviewing on-base college programs—with enhanced quality control specifically the agenda.

State Licensing and Higher Education Coordinating Bodies[19]

In January 1977, the Education Commission of the States issued a *Final Report and Recommendations* of a Task Force on State, Institutional, and Federal Responsibilities in Providing Postsecondary Education Opportunity to Service Personnel. The report addresses many of the issues covered in this essay. It makes a number of recommendations for steps to be taken by the Department of Defense and the separate branches of the armed services to improve on-base, voluntary educational services. But its major thrust is found in the first sentence of its first recommendation: "The States should play a strong leadership role, working with postsecondary institutions and the Department of Defense, in planning and coordinating educational opportunities for military personnel."

The Report received a mixed review from the military services. Some education officers connected with the military believed the report was precisely on target. Appropriate educational bodies at the state level, they argued, were in the best possible position to improve the quality of on-base programs. State agencies license or charter colleges and universities under their jurisdiction. They determine (or can by new law determine) which out-of-state institutions should be allowed to purvey educational services within the states. They have or can create the bureaucratic or advisory apparatus needed to monitor on-base educational enterprises.

Opponents of the report took the position that most state licensing, chartering, and coordinating bodies are hopelessly understaffed and inefficient; that military bases are federal enclaves over which states have no legal jurisdiction; that states have no reasonable jurisdiction over overseas bases (or programs aboard ships); and that, in any case, 50 jurisdictions taking 50 different

positions on matters of academic quality and standards would hopelessly entangle the parts of DOD concerned with educational matters.

In the brief interval since the issuance of the report, some states have moved energetically into this area (e.g. Florida, Texas, North Carolina; New York has traditionally been energetic in chartering and licensing matters). But most states, in spite of heroic catalytic efforts by the Institute for Educational Leadership to bring the licensing staffs of the several states together, have had neither the personnel nor the inclination to exercise effective monitoring functions over on-base collegiate programs. This is to be lamented. State agencies *can* provide constructive functions in certifying and maintaining academic quality. The services should welcome this help and should abjure the use of the "Federal enclave" concept where state agencies can patently be of assistance.

Federal Agencies

It is not illogical to suggest that some degree of quality control over postsecondary programs on military bases ought to be exercised by certain federal agencies other than DOD. Insofar as GI Bill and other Veterans-Administration money is involved in supporting military students, for example, VA has a legitimate right and responsibility to look at the quality of what its money is purchasing. In some states, where the state education department or the state university system has backed away from evaluating the programs of out-of-state colleges and universities on in-state military bases, the Veterans-Administration-funded Office of Veterans Education of the state's Department of Public Instruction has been saddled with precisely this responsibility. They have established review panels of in-state faculty. I found the few reviews I had the opportunity to read to be hard-hitting and fair.[20] But I know of few instances where VA, directly or indirectly, has exercised this responsibility—partly out of deference to Federal law (Title 38, U.S. Code) prohibiting Federal agencies from entering areas of traditional academic autonomy. In any case, the major concern of VA is not with academic quality control, but with preventing or correcting gross examples of financial hanky-panky. Sometimes these issues are closely linked, but where they have been so linked VA has demonstrated a propensity to use a hydrogen bomb to eliminate a single machine-gun nest, and/or to inflict punishment on the just and unjust alike. The major higher education associations in Washington have had a running battle with VA over what they believe to be the VA's unfeeling and

bureaucratic attempts to influence academic practice in the name of "accountability."[21] In any case, the issue will soon be moot, as the GI Bill runs out a decade hence.

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has responsibility for determining what institutions are eligible to receive Federal grants. But the U. S. Office of Education's Division of Eligibility and Agency Evaluation, however restive about the adequacy of voluntary accreditation associations in monitoring the academic quality of collegiate programs, does not have the staff to keep track of academic programs on individual military bases.[22]

The General Accounting Office has taken some hard looks at the sleazy financial practices of some educational institutions that are selling services to the military and has looked cursorily at cost-benefit questions related to academic services to the military. But GAO traditionally has had neither the staff competence nor the inclination to make detailed appraisals of the quality of on-base academic programs. This situation is beginning to change as the "old gray lady" becomes rejuvenated in purpose and richer in staff talents. GAO remains an important instrument of accountability for the United States Congress. Its concentrated attention on selected college programs on military bases might well be salutary.

Higher Education Associations

Three Washington-based, higher-education associations—the American Council on Education, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, and the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges—have deep educational envolvement with the military. ACE, through its Office on Educational Credit, assesses the academic value of military training courses. It constructs and operates the GED high-school equivalency examination and is presently exploring the thorny frontiers of credit for experience. But ACE has no mandate, inclination, or staff to review the academic quality of courses taught by civilian institutions on military bases.

What ACE might well do is to ask its Commission on Educational Credit and Credentials to prepare a new statement on awarding credit for experiential and extra-institutional learning, outlining good practices as well as those to be avoided. Such a statement should give attention to the use of credit by examination, the *ACE Guides,* CAEL-type assessment procedures, and recommended limits on the amounts of credit that can be earned through these means.

AASCU and AACJC (representing a universe of twelve higher-education associations) have collaborated in recent years, with financial underwriting from the Carnegie Corporation and from the Pentagon, in what is called the Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges—a loose confederation of over three hundred institutions of higher education that have pledged to cooperate in facilitating the collegiate pursuits of service personnel.[23] The SOC is run by a small staff in Washington, which is all but overwhelmed by the day-to-day problems of dealing with individual services and effectively coordinating and monitoring compliance with logistical guidelines on the part of its hundreds of affiliated institutions. For these reasons, SOC could not possibly assume major responsibilities for the quality of courses taught on base. But it can add considerations of quality control to its continuing concern with providing flexible services to military personnel.

Perhaps the most significant development at the association level has been the recent creation by ACE of a high-level Commission on Military/Higher-Education Relations, which may well serve an extremely useful function in addressing and orchestrating some of the problems detailed in this paper.

Accrediting Associations

Most of those concerned with quality-control issues ultimately turn to the privately managed and voluntarily supported national and regional accrediting associations. These come together, sometimes uneasily, in The Council on Postsecondary Accreditation (COPA), located in Washington, D.C.

COPA is the holding company for more than fifty specialized accrediting associations (for professionally oriented fields like law, medicine, landscape architecture, engineering, business, library science, etc.) and six regional institutionally oriented accrediting bodies (North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Middles States . . ., New England . . ., Southern . . ., Western . . ., and Northwestern . . .).

The system of voluntary accreditation arose in the United States because of the decentralized and pluralistic character of American postsecondary education, and because no state except New York had instituted a system of state review of collegiate quality.

In essence, voluntary accreditation involves a designated accrediting agency or association evaluating an institution or program of study and certifying publicly that it meets certain predetermined qualifications or standards. This is done in the United

States through a combination of mandated self-studies and site-visits by external teams. Institutions or programs are required to formulate their goals and to document the quality of resources used for their accomplishment.

Voluntary accreditation is the bedrock of academic quality maintenance in the United States, but the bedrock is perched precariously on shifting shoals. Designed in an era of relative agreement about educational functions and structures, accrediting agencies are now all but overwhelmed by the recent proliferation of institutions, programs, and systems, and by the development of non-traditional studies and other heterodoxies. Dependent for site-reviews on the voluntary services of academics, unsure about what to observe and what to measure (and how frequently), challenged by those who view them as conspiracies in restraint of trade, and pressured by government agencies to undertake monitoring and policing roles for which they are not equipped, accrediting associations are in the position of a hunter trying to shoot ducks from a roller coaster. Furthermore, most of the questions they have put to traditional campuses (i.e. "What is the size of your library?" "How many Ph.D.'s do you have among your tenured faculty?" and "What is the faculty-student ratio?"), may be starkly irrelevant to the on-base practices of campus satellites.

Aware of the protests, concerns, and needs in this area, COPA and its affiliates have recently tried to respond to the peculiar problems of academic quality control on military bases. As indicated earlier, they are conducting ten case studies of college programs on military bases for the Pentagon. A COPA committee chaired by Grover Andrews of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools has been making a full-dress study of non-traditional education. Some colleges and universities that are deeply involved in purveying courses on military bases have received assistance in reviewing on-base programs from accrediting associations, which periodically conduct site-visits to main campuses.[24] All these manifestations of interest, concern, and activity are heartening. But they have hardly scratched the surface of the problem. And some new postsecondary institutions that have sprung up to serve the military market may not have merited the formal accreditation they have received. One new institution, for example, received accreditation with only 3,000 library books and a full-time faculty of four. And many institutions that have sound home-base programs seem to throw all caution to the wind when money is to be made on a distant military base.

The nation's voluntary accrediting associations are to be praised

for their recent attempts to monitor the quality of the on-base academic programs of nearly a thousand colleges and universities. But the COPA membership cannot carry the entire burden of quality control on military bases by itself.

What To Do?

In view of the plethora of officials and agencies involved in these issues, and in view of the inability of any one of them to monitor singlehandedly the quality of on-base academic programs, what can be done? Each, of course, can be admonished to conduct a bootstrap operation—to "do a better job" with whatever quality-control instruments are at its disposal.

In the preceding pages I have tried to suggest accretionary but promising developments that warrant exploration and implementation. But it is my preliminary judgment that totally new mechanisms may be needed. The issues are sufficiently complex and sufficiently important to warrant the considered attention of the Commission on Military-Higher Education Relations recently appointed by the American Council on Education. In addition to examining and promoting carefully considered accretionary steps of the kind identified in the past few pages, the committee might well look at bolder options.

At the national level, for example, it might be worth considering the merging of some of the service-related activities of the American Council on Education, the Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, and the Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges to form a National Council for Service-Related Postsecondary Education. Funded by private foundations, DOD contracts, and service charges to individuals for maintaining a centralized, computerized, academic credit-bank for all military personnel, such an entity might bring more coherence to the national academic/military interface than anything presently in existence. It would be ideal if the Community College of the Air Force and the Regents External Degree Program in New York could be induced to cooperate fully with such a new entity. But even without such cooperation, a National Council for Service-Related Postsecondary Education could well be a major force in improving the quality of, and facilitating the academic fungibility of, on-base collegiate education and training.

For purposes of detailed quality control, however, such a Coun-

cil would need a number of affiliated regional bodies—perhaps six—to perform site visits and other monitoring services on military bases in this country. Small regional Centers for Service-Related Postsecondary Education, armed with the resources and prestige to tap qualified academic personnel to serve on site visits and related academic panels, could place at the disposal of base commanders and ESO's exactly the kind of qualified educational assistance they so desperately need.

The boards of the regional Centers should contain top university and collegiate leaders in the region, representatives of state licensing staffs and regional accrediting associations, and an appropriate military presence (selected ESO's or key military officers). An executive director would look to the board for guidance on policy matters. He or she would put together teams of qualified academics to provide quality reviews of academic programs on military bases in the region, to help base commanders and ESO's screen colleges and universities before they are allowed on base, and to prepare annual reports on the overall strength of the educational offerings purveyed.

Reviews of overseas programs could be arranged directly through the National Council in Washington, which would exercise loose coordination over the regional Centers.

This notion may turn out to be redundant if in fact the COPA accrediting associations can rise to the leadership challenge, and if many of the accretionary steps outlined above can be implemented. But something substantial will have to happen through traditional institutions or new instrumentalities if the present mishmash of off-duty, on-base postsecondary education in this country is to achieve and maintain dignity, status, and true quality.

As regards the negative findings reported in this paper, I believe they reflect a facet of the general condition of postsecondary education—a condition in which commitment to high standards in postsecondary education has become dangerously eroded throughout the nation. An enormous but imperative agenda of reform lies ahead. Perhaps if college programs on military bases can be elevated in quality and given greater focus and a more coherent purpose, a model will have been established for upgrading America's larger universe of postsecondary education.

Footnotes

[1]Stephen K. Bailey, "Flexible Time-Space Programs: A Plea for Caution," in D. W. Vermilye (ed.), *The Expanded Campus* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972).

[2]See letter from H. L. Krieger, Director, Federal Personnel and Compensation Division of the United States General Accounting Office, to the Honorable John P. White, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Defense, Reference B-175773, June 19, 1978.

[3]Major C. L. Anderson, "Today's Army: Your Partner in Continuing Education" (Mimeo) Army Continuing Education System, Forrestall Building, Rm. 5A-109, Washington, D.C., p.3. For a list of the hundreds of schools and colleges purveying off-duty education for the Army, see *Project Ahead: Catalog of Participating Colleges*, Second Edition U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois (undated). For the Navy, see *U.S. Navy Off-Duty Education Catalog: Academic Year 1977-1978*, CNET P1560/6, 1 Sept. 1977. The Air Force indicates that "Approximately 500 regionally accredited colleges and universities have cooperative arrangements with [Air Force] Education Service Centers. See *Community College of the Air Force* General Catalog, 1977-78, CCAF, Lackland AFB, Texas, 78236, pp. 1-11.

[4]Letter from Krieger, *op.cit.*

[5]For an excellent short summary of the Tuition Assistance Program and Veterans Administration benefits applicable to off-duty study by military personnel, see Army Continuing Education System, *Old Reliable University Catalog of Programs 1978-1980*, Ft. Lewis, Washington State, pp. 20-22.

[6]See, for example, U. S. Senate, *Hearings* before the Sub-Committee on Readjustment, Education, and Employment of the Committee on Veterans Affairs, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Oct. 1 and 2, 1975, p. 4.

[7]Bases visited, U.S. Navy: Naval Air Station, North Island, San Diego, California; Naval Air Station, Miramar, San Diego, California; Naval Station, San Diego, California; Naval Training Center, San Diego, California; Naval Air Station, Memphis/Millington, Tennessee; Naval Station and Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Guided Missile School, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Naval Amphibian Base, Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia. U.S. Army: Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. U.S. Air Force: Lackland AFB, San Antonio, Texas; Pope AFB, Fayetteville, North Carolina. U.S. Marine Corps: Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina.

[8]I found very few useful historical studies of the military's involvement in higher education. But by far the most pertinent recent study is David Christopher Berry's *Higher Education in the United States Army* (New York: Carlton Press, 1977). See also C. O. Houle et al. *The Armed Services and Adult Education* (Washington, D.C.: ACE, 1947); and John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). For a useful bibliography of relevant public documents see Berry, *op. cit.* pp. 244-247.

[9]Berry, *op. cit.* p .42.

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 2.

[11]There is now a fairly voluminous literature on the emergence of non-traditional studies here and abroad during the past decade. See, for example, K. P. Cross, J. P. Valley, and Associates, *Planning Non-traditional Programs: An Analysis of the Issues for Post-Secondary Education* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); C. O. Houle, *The External Degree* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975); L. Medsker et al., *Extending Opportunities for a College Degree: Practices, Problems and Potential* (Berkeley, Ca.: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1975); Morris T. Keeton and Associates, *Experiential Learning* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1976); D. W. Vermilye (ed.), *The Expanded Campus* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1972); *Guide to Undergraduate External Degree Programs in the United States*, The National Institute of Education, DHEW, Dec. 1977; and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of Navy Memorandum FOR BP-099B; "Trip and Status Report on the Council for the Advancement of Experiential Learning, 16 Jan. 1978."

[12]Testimony by Dr. John P. White, Assistant Secretary of DOD for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, Hearings for the Defense Sub-Committee of the House Appropriations Committee, Feb. 21, 1978, p. 20. According to *Business Week*, Feb. 24, 1975 "Each branch of the Armed forces employs an advertisting agency."

[13]These were selected from a variety of sources, especially *Old Reliable U, op cit., Catalog of Army Education Centers*, Second Edition, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois (undated); and *Military Career Education Programs: Counselor Handbook*, University of Hawaii Community College, Manpower Training Office, University of Hawaii, 1977-78.

[14]*ACE Guide to the Evaluation of Educational Experiences in the Armed Services*, (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, One Dupont Circle, periodic).

[15]For independent corroboration of this conclusion, see Terrence J. MacTaggart, "New Consumers in Higher Education: Extended Programs for Military Students," *North Central Association Quarterly*, Vol. 51, No. 2, Fall 1976, pp. 288-295; and Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges, *Education on Military Bases: The Problem of Quality Control*, Issue Papers, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1977. See also, Kenneth H. Ashworth and William C. Lindley, "The Disgrace of Military Base Programs," *Change*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Feb. 1977, pp. 8, 61.

[16]See Recommendation #7 of Edwin C. Peterson, *A Survey of the Administration of Pacific Air Force Base Education Services Program.* A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the School of Education, University of Southern California, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education, August 1977, p. 87.

[17]For a review of recent developments in educational technology in the military, see the special issue on "Military Training" of *Educational Technology*, Vol. xviii, No. 3, March 1978, *passim.*

[18]See, for example, Kenneth J. Coffey, "Manpower for Military Mobilization," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. for a description of what is happening to Army reserve recruitment.

[19]For a basic introduction to state activity in this area, see Robert J. Barak and Robert O. Berdahl, *State Level Academic Program Review,* Prepared for the Inservice Education Program, Education Commission of the States, Denver, Colorado, February 1978. See also Steven Jung et al. *A Study of State Oversight in Post-Secondary Education,* American Institute for Research, U.S. Office of Education, DHEW, 30 December 1977; and *Final Report and Recommendations,* Task Force on State, Institutional, and Federal Responsibilities in Providing Postsecondary Educational Opportunity to Service Personnel, Education Commission of the States, Report No. 94, January 1977.

[20]A good example is "Report of the Team of Examiners, Bachelor of Arts in Human Resource Management and Master of Arts in Human Resource Management" offered by Pepperdine University at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N.C. and Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, N.C., North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, Office of Veterans Education, March 7, 1977.

[21]See *The Chronicle of Higher Education,* XV, No. 7, October 18, 1976 for a report of legislative provisions for the revised GI Bill that have driven the VA even further in these directions.

[22]See David Trivett, *Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility,* ERIC/ Higher Education Research Report No. 9, Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1976.

[23]For further information on the Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges and its programs, write to SOC, Suite 700, One Dupont Circle Washington, D.C. 20036.

[24]For typical examples, see Report of a Visit to Pope Air Force Base, An Extended Campus Site of Webster College, November 17-18, 1977, by a North Central Association Team (Mimeo); and *Report to the Faculty, Administration, Trustees, Students of University of Maryland University College by an Evaluation Team Representing the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association,* April 25-28, 1976. See also the University of Maryland accompanying *Self-Study.*

Appendix A

Off-Duty Education Programs of the Four Services

Since the early 70's, all of the armed services have been the beneficiaries of the Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges—a cooperative enterprise of the major higher education association in Washington. Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges

> consists of nearly four hundred community and four-year colleges and universities working to help service personnel in the United States and at bases overseas progress steadily towards an associate or baccalaureate degree. Participating colleges have liberal admissions and credit transfer policies, and reduced residency requirements for the military student. SOC colleges recognize the GED equivalency diploma for high school graduation. They also award academic credit for the College Level Examination Program (CLEP), correspondence courses, and military formal school training applicable to a degree program.

(Description taken from "A Guide to Marine Corps Education and Career Opportunities," an undated brochure prepared by the Education Programs of the Marine Corps.)

The Army and Marine Corps take greater advantage of SOC than do either the Navy or the Air Force. But theoretically all services have equal access to SOC opportunities.

All the services contract with individual colleges and universities for college courses or university-level courses to be offered on military bases for the benefit of service personnel who wish to pursue postsecondary education opportunities when they are off-duty.

U.S. Army

The Army's off-duty post-secondary opportunities are built around two basic programs: Project Ahead (Army Help for Education and Development) and SOCAD (Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges Associated Degree).

Project Ahead offers young people an opportunity to enroll in college and enlist in the Army simultaneously.

> Universities and colleges, including non-profiit technical institutes, work with the Army by establishing tailored admission policies, appointing an academic adviser, recognizing non-traditional learning experiences, accepting transferred credits and establishing and maintaining academic records for soldier students.

(Quote from *Pro-Life Program*, Army Education Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., p. 17).

The adviser in the enrolled-in college will explain to the student which college courses offered on military bases will be accepted for credit.

Beginning in the fall of 1977, the Army announced the Servicemen's Opportunity Colleges Associate Degree. SOCAD

> provides for the direct transfer of Army training and experience to an academic degree using the credit recommendations of the *ACE Guide*. Participants may be awarded the degree based on a combination of *ACE Guide* credits, resident instruction and non-traditional education means available through the Defense Activity for Non-traditional Education Support (DANTES) . . . Schools participating agree to:
> (a) Accept *ACE Guide* recommendations for military training and experience.
> (b) Limit residence requirements to no more than one-fourth of the total program.
> (c) Identify alternate ways in which credit toward the degree may be earned and provide the degree candidate a "letter of agreement" showing what credits are required.
> (d) Provide educational counseling for the participant.
> (e) Provide opportunity for continued educational programs regardless of duty station.
> (f) Provide a flexible curriculum with no more than one-half the credits prescribed.

(Language taken from HQDA Ltr 621-77-4, Office of the Adjutant General and the Adjutant General Center, Washington, D.C. 20314, 6 September 1977).

U.S. Navy

All voluntary off-duty educational experiences in the Navy are coordinated by a management system called the Navy Campus for Achievement (NCFA). NCFA works with roughly twenty cooperating institutions of higher education that have agreed to allow up to 75 percent of a degree requirement to be met in the form of non-traditional education, such as Navy rating or on-the-job experience. They have also agreed to unlimited and undiluted credit

transfer for NCFA Degree Program students. Finally, all have waived their residency requirements for NCFA Degree Program students.

NCFA provides educational counselling and advisory services on base and special institutional services afloat. Through the Program for Afloat College Education (PACE), like the other services, the Navy signs contracts with many institutions of higher education to purvey discrete courses on Navy bases or afloat.

U.S. Air Force

Off-duty education in the U. S. Air Force is managed and conducted through the Air Force Education Services Program. AFES signs contracts with higher-education institutions to purvey on-base education services. The most distinctive feature of the Air Force's higher education program is the Community College of the Air Force (CCAF)—a superbly orchestrated logistical system that facilitates the academic progress of air personnel toward an associate degree awarded by the Air Force itself.

Of all the services, the Air Force places the greatest stress on graduate degrees for higher officer ranks. Although an earned master's degree is not an absolute prerequisite for achieving the rank of major, many of those who achieve that rank hold master's degrees. In FY '76, 70,000 Air Force officers were enrolled in graduate-level courses.*

U.S. Marine Corps

The Off-Duty Education Programs of the Marine Corps feature connections with SOC, and a panoply of college course available on Marine bases.

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* See *Off-Duty Education*, U.S. Airforce Education Services Program. Mimeo text accompanying slides, undated, but made available to author at Lackland Air Force Base, January 1978.

Appendix B

Partial List of Colleges and Universities Whose Programs Were Found on the Thirteen Bases Visited by the Author in 1978

Institution	*Home Campus*
Azusa Pacific College	Los Angeles, CA
Barstow College	Barstow, CA
Beaufort County Technical Institute	Washington, NC
Campbell College	Buies Creek, NC
Central Carolina Technical Institute	Sanford, NC
Central Michigan University	Mount Pleasant, MI
Central Texas College	Kileen, TX
Chapman College	Orange, CA
Chaminade College of Honolulu	Honolulu, HI
Chicago City-wide College	Chicago, IL
Craven Community College	New Bern, NC
East Carolina University	Greenville, NC
El Paso Community College	Colorado Springs, CO
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University	Daytona Beach, FL
Fayetteville Technical University	Fayetteville, NC
George Washington University	Washington, DC
Golden Gate University	San Francisco, CA
Hawaii Pacific College	Honolulu, HI
Johnston Technical Institute	Smithfield, NC
LaVerne College	LaVerne, CA
Memphis State University	Memphis, TN
Methodist College	Fayetteville,NC
National University	San Diego, CA
Norfolk State College	Norfolk, VA
North Carolina State University at Raleigh	Raleigh, NC
Old Dominion University	Norfolk, VA
Pamlico Technical Institute	Grantsboro, NC

Institution	*Home Campus*
Pepperdine University	Malibu, CA
San Diego Community College District	San Diego, CA
Southwestern College	Chula Vista, CA
Southern Illinois University	Carbondale, IL
Shelby State Community College	Shelby, TN
St. Leo College	St. Leo, FL
Stanley Technical Institution	Albermarle, NC
State Technical Institute	Memphis, TN
Tidewater Community College	Portsmouth, VA
University of Arkansas	Fayetteville, AR
University of California-San Diego	San Diego, CA
University of Hawaii	Honolulu, HI
University of Northern Colorado	Greeley, CO
University of Oklahoma	Norman, OK
University of Southern California	Los Angeles, CA
University of Southern Illinois	Carbondale, IL
Webster College	St. Louis, MO

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